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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GORDON C. MeGAVIN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
PREFERRED INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
. . . WAYNE MURRAY and WAYNE
MURRAY, JR., doing business as MURRAY & COMPANY, a co-partnership,
UTAH MOTOR CLUB, INC., a corporation, and SAM ARGE,
Defendants and Respondents.

No .
8714

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

(a) Preliminary Statement
This is an
action entered
Utah, on May
The motion to

appeal from a judgment of dismissal of the
by the District Court of Salt Lake County,
29, 1957, in civil No. 106,957 (R. 44-45).
dismiss the amended complaint was filed by
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defendan.ts and respondents herein (R. 38). Preferred Underwriters, Inc., the attorney-in-fact for Preferred Insurance Exchange, is a foreign corporatoin which never has qualified
to do business in Utah (R. 17, 33). No service of process has
been obtained on said foreign corporation, and it is not one
of the respondents on this appeal.
The motion to dismiss the amended complaint was based
on the allegation that the said amended complaint ((does not
state any facts or grounds upon which relief can be granted
against these defendants or any of them." (R. 38). The District
Court furnished no explanation as a basis for granting the
motion to dismiss.

(b) The Amended Complaint
The prime question to be determined on this appeal is
whether the amended complaint states facts upon which relief
can be granted against the defendants and respondents or any
of them. We set forth the entire amended complaint, except
for the title of the action (R. 28-32):
(The plaintiff comes now by leave of court first had
and obtained, and files this amended complaint, whereby plaintiff complains against defendants and for cause
of action alleges:
t

t t

1. Defendant Preferred Insurance Exchange, now

is and was at all times herein mentioned, a reciprocal
insurance exchange, unincorporated, transacting business through and under its attorney-in-fact, Preferred
Underwriters, Inc., a corporation not organized under
the laws of the State of Utah. During the times hereinafter mentioned, said Preferred Insurance Exchange
has engaged in business in the State of Utah through
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state, district and local agents, writing automobile and
liability insurance.
''2. Defendant Preferred Underwriters, Inc., in addition to acting as attorney-in-fact for Preferred Insurance
Exchange, since about January, 195 5 has been engaged
in business in the State of Utah as a general insurance
agency for writing of fire insurance and other insurance.
Said Preferred Underwriters, Inc., has never qualified
to do business in the State of Utah as a foreign corporation.

"3. Defendants Wayne Murray and Wayne Murray,
Jr., were at all times herein mentioned, a co-partnership
engaged in the insurance business as Murray & Company. Defendant Wayne Murray, Jr., was at all times
herein mentioned the president and general manager
of Preferred Insurance Exchange, and also the president and general manager of Preferred Underwriters,
Inc., a foreign corporation.
"4. Defendant Utah Motor Club, Inc., now is and
was at all times herein mentioned, a corporation of
Utah. Defendant Sam Arge was at all times herein
mentioned, general manager of said Utah Motor Club,
Inc.
"5. On or about January 20, 1955, Preferred Underwriters, Inc., as attorney-in-fact for Preferred Insurance
Exchange, by written instrument appointed Paul J.
Parish, of Montebello, California, as state agent in U tab
for Preferred Insurance Exchange. Preferred Underwriters, Inc., also appointed Paul J. Parish as state
agent in Utah to write fire insurance and other insurance. Wayne Murray and Wayne Murray, Jr., doing
business as Murray & Company, also appointed Paul
J. Parish as state agent in Utah to write life insurance
and other insurance. Said defendants instructed Paul J.
Parish to set up an office in Utah and to appoint such
agents as said Parish deemed essential to establish an

5
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organization through which automobile, casualty, fire,
liability, life and other insurance could be sold in the
State of Utah.
((6. On or about March 10, 1955, said Paul J. Parish,
state agent for said defendants, entered into agreement
with plaintiff whereby plaintiff was appointed an agent
for Preferred Insurance Exchange and an agent for
Preferred Underwriters, Inc., in Utah, and plaintiff
was also appointed acting state agent to assist said
Paul J. Parish in the management of the state agency
for Preferred Insurance Exchange and for Preferred
Underwriters, Inc. Paul J. Parish promised that plaintiff
would be paid the regular agent's commission on all
policies sold direct! y by him and also receive a share
of the overriding commissions on all insurance sold
in the State of Utah for Preferred Insurance Exchange,
until the plaintiff received $1,000.00 per month. Said
Paul J. Parish told plaintiff that plaintiff would have
an opportunity for permanent employment at a substantial income.
((7. Said defendants were informed of said appoint-

ment and employment, and about April 1955, defendants Preferred Insurance Exchange and Preferred Underwriters, Inc., approved and acquiesced in said appointment and employment of plaintiff as an agent for
said companies and as acting state agent in Utah. Said
defendants instructed plaintiff to procure state licenses
from the State of Utah to sell automobile and fire insurance, which plaintiff did; and said two defendants
told plaintiff to proceed to appoint district and local
agents, and said defendants promised to file with the
State Insurance Department a power of attorney authorizing hin1 to appoint agents. Said defendants also
promised: (a) To furnish promptly to plaintiff advertising tnatter to start a sales campaign; (b) to promptly
file with the State Insurance Department, all necessary
rate schedules essential to meet competitors, to enable

6
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plaintiff and local agents to obtain a substantial volume
of business; (c) to file any other documents which
might be essential to carry on a diversified insurance
business in Utah; (d) to furnish plaintiff without delay
assistance in the training of agents for selling insurance;
and (e) to give plaintiff such further assistance as
would be necessary to build up a state organization in
Utah to assure Paul J. Parish and plaintiff a good
volume of business and a substantial income.
((8. Said defendants further told plaintiff that he
should not concern himself with quotas in Utah for the
time being, nor be too much concerned about selling
policies himself, but that he should direct his chief
efforts to finding suitable agents, to bel p train agents,
to take care of administrative work, to conduct investigations requested by said defendants, and to make other
contacts deemed essential by defendants to promote
good public relations. Defendants told plaintiff that he
would make a substantial income out of overriding
commissions from future business in Utah, and that
notwithstanding some time would elapse before such
income would be obtained, as the program was a long
range program, he would obtain a much greater income
than if he spent his time selling.

((9. Plaintiff relied on the promises of said Preferred
Insurance Exchange, Preferred Underwriters, Inc., and
Murray & Company, and plaintiff traveled through the
State at his own expense to find suitable agents for
Preferred Insurance Exchange, and said defendants
recognized said agents so appointed. Plaintiff conducted all of the investigations requested by said defendants, made all of the contacts requested by defendants, and performed all other administrative duties
assigned to him between April and October 1955, all
at his own expense.
n

10. Said defendants failed and neglected to perform

their promises as set forth in paragraph 7 hereof: (a)

7
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Preferred Insurance Exchange and Preferred Underwriters, Inc., as attorney-in-fact for Preferred Insurance
Exchange, sent advertising material which was false and
misleading, in that said advertising material represented
that Preferred Insurance Exchange offered lower rates
than competitors, when in fact some rates were higher;
and notwithstanding plaintiff informed defendants that
said material was having an adverse effect in Utah,
said defendants did not make any new advertising
material available until September 1955, just prior to
time Preferred Underwriters, Inc., appointed Utah
Motor Club, Inc., state agent for Preferred Insurance
Exchange. (b) Said defendants did not :file any competitive rate schedules until July 1955, nor until plaintiff
conducted the investigations requested by said defendants. (e) Said defendants delayed until September
1955, the sending of any representative to Utah to give
assistance in a sales training program. (d) Said defendants neither filed a power of attorney for plaintiff,
nor filed the necessary documents essential to qualify
Preferred Insurance Exchange and Preferred Underwriters, Inc., to engage in business in Utah. (e) Instead
of giving plaintiff assistance essential to help build
a state organization in Utah to assure Paul J. Parish
and plaintiff a good volume of business and a substantial incon1e, after learning that plaintiff had contacted
Utah Motor Club, Inc., in an effort to appoint said
corporation a district agent, said Preferred Insurance
Exchange, Preferred Underwriters, Inc., and Murray
& Company, without the consent of plaintiff and without the consent of Paul J. Parish, entered into an agreement with Utah Motor Club, Inc., and Sam Arge,
whereby Utah Motor Club, Inc., on or about September
28, 1955, \vas appointed state agent in Utah for Preferred Insurance Exchange by Preferred Underwriters,
Inc., notwithstanding Preferred Insurance Exchange
and Preferred Underwriters, Inc., and Murray and
Cotnpany promised plaintiff that no deal would be made
8
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with Utah Motor Club, Inc., except one which would
be satisfactory to plaintiff. (f) Said defendants also
procured from plaintiff the list of contacts of insurance
prospects from plaintiff in October 195 5, for the purpose of giving the same to Utah Motor Club, Inc., to
enable Utah Motor Club, Inc., to reap benefits from
the efforts of the plaintiff. (g) Said defendants Preferred Insurance Exchange, Preferred Underwriters,
Inc., and Murray & Company, in September 1955, induced plaintiff to go to the expense and take the time
necessary to arrange for a meeting of all district and
local agents, on the promise that he was going to have
a substantial income from his position, while at the
same time said defendants were negotiating behind the
back of plaintiff to deprive plaintiff of present and
future compensation by way of overriding commissions
which said defendants had promised, and to transfer
the business over to Utah Motor Club, Inc., without
compensation to plaintiff whatsoever.
((II. Plaintiff was given no notice of termination of
his employment, nor any compensation for his services.
By the acts of the defendants they made it impossible
for Paul J. Parish to perform his agreement with plaintiffs, notwithstanding Preferred Insurance Exchange
and Preferred Underwriters, Inc., and Murray & Company approved said appointment made by Paul J.
Parish and induced plaintiff to perform services for
seven months. In October 195 5, said defendants falsely
represenetd that Paul J. Parish had resigned as state
agent, and that plaintiff should contact Sam Arge of
Utah Motor Club, Inc. Thereupon, about November 1,
1955, Utah Motor Club, Inc., informed plaintiff that
it had been appointed state agent in place of Paul J.
Parish, and that the only way plaintiff would be allowed to sell insurance was to sell to people who would
buy membership in Utah Motor Club, Inc. In November 1955 the State Insurance Department advised plaintiff that he could not sell insurance under such a plan

9
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as said arrangement was unauthorized by the State and
said plan was illegal. Plaintiff was thereby hindered
and prevented from performing any further services
for said defendants by their own acts.
((12. By said acts of defendant companies they re-

pudiated their agreement with plaintiff whereby they
induced plaintiff to render various services in building
up a state organization on the promise of substantial
overriding commissions in the future, although plaintiff performed in good faith for more than seven months
the service required of him, to his damage in the sum
of $10,000.00. In addition to cutting off the means of
receiving said overriding commissions, to completely
deprive the plaintiff of the fruits of his labors, Preferred Insurance Exchange paid the balance of his
regular commissions to Utah Motor Club, Inc. Plaintiff
alleges that by their conduct defendants manifested
an intention to deprive plaintiff of not only the fruits
of his labors, but to devise a scheme to have him
work without compensation, and that it would be
appropriate to assess punitive damages against defendants in the sum of $25,000.
((WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against
defendants in the sum of $10,000.00 actual damages,
for $25,000.00 exemplary damages, for an accounting
on commissions and overriding commissions, for costs
and other appropriate relief."

s·r_A TEMENT OF POINTS ON WHICH APPELLANT
RELIES FOR REVERSAL OF THE JUDGMENT
1. A n1otion to dismiss admits the truth of the allegation

of the pleading which it assails.
2. The amended complaint states facts which show that
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plaintiff is entitled to recover at least for services performed
during a seven months' period and for expenses incurred in
connection therewith at the instance and request of Preferred
Insurance Exchange.
3. Preferred Underwriters, Inc., a noncomplying foreign
corporation, attorney-in-fact for Preferred Insurance Exchange,
is not an indispensible party to this action.
4. All of the defendants are liable in tort for unconscionable dealings behind the back of plaintiff.

ARGUMENT

I.
A MOTION TO DISMISS ADMITS THE TRUTH OF
THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE PLEADING WHICH IT
ASSAILS.
In the case of Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American
Corp.J 161 F. 2d 811, the Court of Appeals held that the facts
alleged in the pleading are admitted by the motion to dismiss.
HI£ the plaintiff is entitled to any relief under these facts, the
motion to dismiss should have been overruled. Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 (a) 28 U. S. C. A. following section
723 c; Guth v. Texas Co., 7 Cir., 155 F. 2d 563."

II.
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT STATES FACTS
WHICH SHOW THAT PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO
RECOVER AT LEAST FOR SERVICES PERFORMED DUR11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ING A SEVEN MONTHS' PERIOD AND FOR EXPENSES
INCURRED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH AT THE
INSTANCE AND REQUEST OF PREFERRED INSURANCE
EXCHANGE.
This is not a case where an agent was employed on a
commission basis with unlimited opportunity in a given territory, and given the necessary tools to work with as an agent,
and then the relation of principal and agent was terminated.
This is a case where plaintiff was appointed agent and also
state manager for a reciprocal insurance exchange which was
just getting started in Utah. Said insurer and its attorney-infact not only approved his appointment as agent, but gave
directions to him to perform various services for said insurer,
to appoint and train other agents, make various contacts, perform administrative work and other things for said insurer,
on the promise that he would be compensated by overriding
commissions on a substantial volume of future business. In this
case the insurer discouraged the plaintiff from spending very
much time vvriting insurance, and induced him to spend approxin1ately seven months to build up a sales organization; and
after plaintiff performed those services at his own expense,
the insurer and its attorney-in-fact made it impossible for him
to reap the fruits of his labors by turning the state agency and
its tnanagement over to Utah Motor Club, Inc., which plaintiff
previous! y had contacted with a view of making it a district
agency.
The appropriate rule applicable to the fact situtaion of this
case is stated in Beebe l'. Columbia Axle Co.J 233 Mo. App. 212,
117 S. W. 2d 624, at 629:
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UThe limitation is that, in case of an indefinite agency
where it is revoked by the principal, if it appears that
the agent, induced by his appointment, has in good faith
incurred expense and devoted time and labor in the
matter of the agency without having had a sufficient
opportunity to recoup such from the undertaking, the
principal will be required to compensate him in that
behalf; for the law will not permit one thus to deprive
another of value without awarding just compensation.
The just principle acted upon by the courts in the circumstances suggested requires no more than that, in
every instance, the agent shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to avail himself of the primary expenditures and efforts put forth to the end of executing the
authority conferred upon him and that, if such opportunity is denied him, the principal shall compensate
him accordingly."
The foregoing rule was quoted and adopted in the case
of Fargo Glass & Paint Co. v. Globe American Corporation,
161 F. 2d 811. The court adopted the Missouri rule to the effect
that an orally appointed agent for an indefinite time, who,
induced by his appointment, has in good faith incurred expenses and devoted time and labor to the agency without having
had sufficient opportunity to recoup, is entitled to compensation
therefor from his principal. In the Fargo case, ((The defendant
says it may cancel the contract with impunity." The Court of
Appeals held otherwise.
It was argued in the District Court that plaintiff was appointed by Paul J. Parish, and that plaintiff should look to
Parish for compensation. The amended complaint shows that
Preferred Underwriters, Inc., appointed Parish state agent,
and directed him to appoint other agents and to build up a
state organization. Furthermore, the amended complaint shows

13
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that after plaintiff was appointed an agent for Preferred Insurance Exchange and acting state manager, said Preferred
Insurance Exchange and its attorney-in-fact approved said
appointment and gave instructions and directions to the plaintiff. Said two companies instructed him to appoint oth~r agents
and train agents which he did, and said companies recognized
the agents so appointed.
In Hall v. Douglas Aircraft Co., (Cal. App.), 73 P. 2d
668 (hearing denied by Supreme Court), it was pointed out
that where a principal ratifies the appointment of a subagent
and gives directions to the subagent in conducting negotiations,
the principal constitutes such subagent its own agent. Furthermore, the court held in that case that the principal could not
defeat the right to compensation on a contingent basis by
wiping out the margin or ((differential" on which the contingent compensation was to be computed. The District Court
of Appeal held that the agent was entitled to reasonable value
of his services under such circumstances.
In the case of Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2nd
9, 261 P. 2d 927, this Honorable Court recognized the basic
rule that a principal who agrees that commission shall be paid
only on a consummated sale, contemplates the duty of the
principal to cooperate in good faith toward the consummation
of a sale, and that the principal cannot defeat the right of the
agent to compensation by arbitrarily refusing to cooperate.

Restate1nent of the Lau·,. Agency, Chapter 14, deals with
duties of the principal to the agent. There are a number of
significant obligations of the principal for fair dealing with
an agent:
14
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((A principal is subject to a duty to an agent to
perform the contract which he has made with the
agent." (Page 1000).
((A principal has a duty not to repudiate or terminate
the employment in violation of the contract of employment." (Page 1060).
·
"If the compensation of the agent is dependent upon
his accomplishment of a result and this result can be
accomplished only if the principal cooperates, the principal's promise to give such cooperation is inferred unless there are manifestations to the contrary." (Page
1002).

((Except where the relationship of the parties, the
triviality of the services, or other circumstances indicate that the parties have agreed otherwise, it is inferred
that one who requests or permits another to perform
services for him as his agent promises to pay for them."
(Page 1027).
((A principal for whom an agent has performed
services in accordance with a voidable contract which
is avoided by one of the parties, or for whom an agent
or purported agent has performed services without a
promise by the principal to pay, is subject to liability
to the agent to the extent that he has been unjustly
enriched by such services." (Page 1077).
((A principal is subject to liability to an agent for
his own conduct as he is to third persons for similar
conduct . . ." (Page 1104) .
(( . . . Correlativ~ with the duties of the agent to
serve loyally and obediently are the principal's duties
of compensation, indemnity, and protection . . . . In
addition, the principal is subject to liability to the agent,
as to any third person, for conduct which would be
tortious aside from the relationship, and is subject to
quasi-contractual liability if he is unjustly enriched at
the agent's expense." (Page 999).

15
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The amended complaint does not merely show that
plaintiff had a valuable and attractive contract with Paul J.
Parish whereby he could expect $1,000.00 per month. The
amended complaint shows that in April 1955 said Preferred
Insurance Exchange and its attorney-in-fact, Preferred Underwriters, Inc., made an express agreement with plaintiff which
said insurance companies violated with impunity after inducing
plaintiff to work for seven months performing various services
for Preferred Insurance Exchange on the promise that he was
going to reap a very substantial harvest of overriding commissions in the future. The amended complaint shows that
said companies arbitrarily and maliciously deprived plaintiff
of opportunity to receive those commissions which he had been
promised, and made it impossible for Parish to perform his
contract with plaintiff. There was more than a mere implied
promise on the part of Preferred Insurance Exchange. The
bargain was not merely to be paid a commission on the policies
he sold personally, but to receive in the future overriding
commissions on the sales made by others.
In giving instructions and directions to plaintiff, said
companies as principal and as attorney-in-fact, told plaintiff
to procure for himself state licenses to sell automobile and fire
insurance, which he did; and to proceed to appoint district
and local agents, which he did in reliance on the promise of
said companies; and that plaintiff traveled through Utah for
seven months at his own expense to find suitable agents for
Preferred Insurance Exchange, and said defendants recognized
the agents he appointed. Said companies also told plaintiff
not to concern hin1self with quotas for the tin1e being, nor be

16
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too much concerned about selling policies himself, but to
direct his chief efforts to finding suitable agents, to bel p train
agents, to take care of administrative work, to conduct investigations requested by said defendants, and to make other contacts deemed essential to said defendants to promote good
public relations. Said companies told plaintiff that he would
make a substantial income out of overriding commissions from
future business in Utah, and that notwithstanding some time
would elapse before such income would be obtained, as the
program was a long range program, he would obtain a much
greater income than if he spent his time selling. Plaintiff performed all services requested.
The amended complaint shows that said two companies
made the following promises to induce plaintiff to perform a
variety of services, on which promises plaintiff relied in good
faith in performing services, and which promises said companies failed to perform:

( 1) Defendants promised to furnish promptly to plaintiff
effective advertising matter to start a sales campaign. Instead,
Preferred Insurance Exchange, and Preferred Underwriters,
Inc., (its attorney-in-fact), sent plaintiff advertising material
which was false and misleading, which represented that Preferred Insurance Exchange offered lower rates than competitors,
when in fact some rates were higher. Although plaintiff informed said defendants that said material was having an
adverse effect in Utah, said defendants did not make any new
advertising material available until September 1955, just prior
to the time Utah Motor Club, Inc., was appointed state agent
for Preferred Insurance Exchange by Preferred Underwriters,
Inc.

17
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Sections 31-27-8 and 9, U. C. A. 1953, prohibit the dissemination and circulation of false information or misrepresentation of the benefits of a policy. Consequently, the defendants did not give plaintiff the tools to work with which were
express!y promised as a means of enabling plaintiff to obtain
a substantial income.

( 2) Said de£ end ants promised to file with the State Insurance Department all necessary rate schedules essential to
meet competitors, to enable plaintiff and local agents to obtain
a substantial volume of business. Said defendants did not file
any competitive rate schedules until July 1955, nor until plaintiff
himself conducted the investigations requested by said defendants. Said defendants then turned the state agency over
to Utah Motor Club, Inc., and made it impossible for plaintiff
to get any volume of business at all.
( 3) Said defendants promised to file any other documents
which might be essential to carry on a diversified insurance
business in Utah. Said defendants did not even file a power
of attorney for plaintiff, nor file the necessary documents essential to fully qualify said defendants to engage in business in
Utah.
( 4) Said defendants promised in April to furnish without
delay assistance in the training of agents for selling insurance.
The defendants delayed until September the sending of any
representative to Utah to give any assistance in a sales training
program. Then it made a deal to oust the plaintiff and to
deny him the protnised benefits of such a program.
( 5) Said defendants promised to furnish plaintiff such
18
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further assistance as would be necessary to build up a state
organization in Utah to assure Parish and plaintiff a good
volume of business and a substantial income. Plaintiff relied
on all of the promises of said defendants, and traveled through
Utah at his own expense to find suitable agents for Preferred
Insurance Exchange, who were recognized as agents by said
defendants; and plaintiff conducted all investigations requested
by defendants, made all contacts requested and performed all
other administrative duties assigned to him by said two defendant companies between April and October 195 5, at his own
expense. Instead of giving plaintiff assistance essential to help
build up a state organization in Utah to assure Parish and
plaintiff a good volume of business and a substantial income,
after learning that plaintiff had contacted Utah ~{otor Club,
Inc., in an effort to appoint said corporation a district agent,
Preferred Insurance Exchange, Preferred Underwriters, Inc.,
and Murray & Company, without the consent of either Parish
or plaintiff on or about September 28, 195 5, entered into an
agreement with Utah Motor Club. Inc., whereby said motor
club was appointed state agent in Utah. Said defendants procured from plaintiff his list of contacts of insurance prospects
for the purpose of giving the same to Utah Motor Club, Inc.,
to reap benefits from the efforts of plaintiff without cotnpensation. In September 1955, said Preferred Insurance Exchange
and Preferred Underwriters, Inc., induced plaintiff to go to
the expense and take the time necessary to arrange for a meeting
of all district and local agents, on the promise that he was going
to have a substantial income from his position, while at the
same time said companies were negotiating behind his back
to deprive him of present and future overriding commissions
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which he had been
over to Utah Motor
plaintiff whatsoever,
perform his contract

promised, and to transfer the business
Club, Inc., without any compensation to
and to make it impossible for Parish to
with plaintiff.

Plaintiff was not given notice of termination of his employment, nor compensation for his services. In October 195 5,
said companies falsely represented to plaintiff that Parish had
resigned as state agent, and instructed him to contact Utah
~Jotor Club, Inc. About November 1, 1955, said Utah Motor
Club, Inc., told plaintiff it had been appointed state agent and
that the only way he would be allowed to sell insurance was
to sell to people who would buy membership in the Utah
Motor Club, Inc. The State Insurance Department advised
plaintiff that such an arrangement was unauthorized and that
said plan was illegal. (Such practices are prohibited by Sections
31-27-14, 15 and 22, U. C. A. 1953). The plaintiff was thereby
hindered and prevented from performing any further services
for said insurance companies, and the means of receiving the
pron1ised overriding commissions was cut off. The plaintiff
performed services for seven months on the promise that he
\vould receive a substantial overriding commission in the future.
This case is a much stronger case than the one mentioned
in the Fargo case where notice of termination was given, and
in which case the judgn1ent of dismissal was reversed.

III.
PREFERRED UNDERWRITERS, INC., A NONCOMPLYING FOREIGN CORPORATION, ATTORNEY-IN20
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FACT FOR PREFERRED INSURANCE EXCHANGE, IS
NOT AN INDISPENSIBLE PARTY TO THIS ACTION.
The fact that Preferred Underwriters, Inc., could not be
served with summons because it is a noncomplying foreign
corporation, which has failed to have a process agent in this
State, does not show that its principal Preferred Insurance
Exchange is immune from liability.
The amended complaint alleges that Preferred Insurance
Exchange was and is an unincorporated reciprocal insurance
exchange in business in Utah through state, district and local
agents, writing automobile and liability insurance. Preferred
Underwriters, Inc., was and is the attorney-in-fact for Preferred
Insurance Exchange, but said Preferred Underwriters, Inc., is
a foreign corporation engaged in business in Utah as a general
insurance agency for writing fire and other insurance, although
it has never qualified to do business in Utah. The fact that
service of summons was obtained on Preferred Insurance
Exchange indicates that it has a process agent in Utah. The
statutes do not require the attorney-in-fact to be joined in a
suit against a reciprocal insurer.
Section 31-10-3, U. C. A. 1953, specifies:
nA (reciprical insurer' as used in this code means
any such unincorporated aggregation of subscribers
operating through an attorney in fact individually and
collectively as an insurance organization for the benefit
of its policyholders."

Section 31-10-11, U. C. A. 1953, defines the rights and
powers of an attorney-in-fact for a reciprocal insurer:
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(( ( 1) The rights and powers of the attorney of a
reciprocal insurer shall be as provided in the power of
attorney given it by the subscribers.

(( (2) The power of attorney must set forth:
(( (a) The powers of the attorney;
(((b) That the attorney is empowered to accept
service of process on behalf of the insurer and to authorize the commissioner to receive service of process
in actions against the insurer upon contracts exchanged;

***"
Notwithstanding the attorney-in-fact for a reciprocal insurer or exchange can make contracts for the reciprocal insurer,
our statute which permits the operation of reciprocal insurance
exchanges, specifically declares that a reciprocal insurer may
rrsue and be sued in its own name" (Sec. 31-10-6 ,U. C. A.
195 3). The statute clearly indicates that the reciprocal insurer
rnay be sued as principal; and the mere fact that its attorneyin-fact is a noncomplying foreign corporation which has failed
to appoint a process agent in the State of Utah, does not prevent
an injured party from suing the insurance exchange as principal
for the acts or omissions of the principal and its attorney-infact acfing on behalf of the reciprocal insurer.
Section 16-8-3, U. C. A. 953, referring to the disabilities
of noncomplying foreign corporations, states that ((every contract, agreement and transaction whatsoever made or entered
into by or on behalf of any such corporation within this state
shall be wholly void on behalf of such corporation and its assignees and every person deriving any interest or title therefrom, but shall be valid and enforceable against such corporation, assignee and person; and any person acting as agent of
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a foreign corporation which shall neglect or refuse to comply
with the foregoing provisions is guilty of a misdemeanor and
shall be personally liable on any and all contracts made in this
state by him for or on behalf of such corporation during the
time that it shall be so in default."
The contract made by Preferred Underwriters, Inc., at
attorney-in-fact for Preferred Insurance Exchange, with Parish
and also the contract made with plaintiff subsequently, were
contracts to be performed in this State. Neither Parish nor
plaintiff consented to the abrogation of those agreements. To
deny to a noncomplyng foreign corporation the right to maintain any action to enforce the same, while making such contracts enforceable against such corporation and its beneficiary,
would be nullified entirely if a noncomplying foreign corporation acting as agent can make a contract which it can repudiate
at will after it has obtained the benefits it seeks for its principal.
It would seem that the right to cancel a contract is a contract
right, and that the disability to exercise a contract right by a
noncomplying foreign corporation precludes the exercise of
a right to terminate an agreement. If it does not, that still
would not make the conduct lawful in this case, nor insulate
the principal from liability. A reciprocal insurer which acts
through a noncomplying foreign corporation certainly does
not have greater rights and immunities by reason of such non{:Ompliance with the law than it would have if the attorney-infact were qualified under the laws of this State.
Obviously, the statutes contemplate that an attorney-infact for a reciprocal insurer shall be one which is qualified to
transact business in this State. The failure to have a qualified
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attorney-in-fact certainly does not exempt the reciprocal insurer from liability as principal, either in contract or in tort.

IV.
i\LL OF THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE IN TORT

FOR UNCONSCIONABLE DEALING BEHIND THE BACK
OF PLAINTIFF.
One of plaintiff's prospects for district agent was Utah
Motor Club, Inc. Preferred Insurance Exchange, Preferred
Undervvriters, and Wayne Murray and Wayne Murray, Jr.,
knew of the contract relationship with plaintiff. Said defendants
other than Utah Motor Club, Inc., induced the plaintiff to
perform additional services in September 1955 on the promise
that he would reap a substantia1 income from future overriding
commissions, and in connection therewith had him go to the
expense of a sales conference with the various agents. Said
defendants behind the plaintiff's back and without the knowledge or approval of Paul J. Parish, made a deal with Utah
Motor Club, Inc., to make it impossible for said defendants
to perform their agreement with plaintiff to pay overriding
commissions. In addition, they made it impossible for plaintiff
to do any selling or to obtain the fruits of his seven months'
work. Furthermore, said defendants arranged to transfer to
Utah Motor Club, Inc., plaintiff's list of insurance prospects,
and also paid over to Utah Motor Club, Inc., the balance of the
regular con1missions which plaintiff had earned. Utah Motor
Club, Inc., knew of plaintiff's position, and it had no right to
take those funds, nor to aid in the scheme to circumvent plain·
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tiff's position and destroy his right to receive overriding commissions on future business.
As pointed out in Restatement of the Law, Agency, page
999, a principal is liable to an agent for conduct which would be
tortious aside from the relationship. Defendants made it impossible for plaintiff to perform any further services by requiring
him to sell insurance on a basis which is prohibited by law,
and which the State Insurance Department advised him would
be illegal.
The tort rule is illustrated in Skene v. Carayanis, 103 Conn.
708, 131 A. 497, 498:
(( ... the principle ... holds liable him who, knowingly and without adequate justification, causes another
to breach his contract. R and W Hat Shop, Inc. v.
Sculley, 98 Conn. 1,119 A. 55, 29 A. L. R. 551. The
law does not, however, restrict its protection to rights
resting upon completed contracts, but it also forbids
unjustifiable intereference with any man's right to
pursue his lawful business or occupation, and to secure
to himself the earnings of his industry. Full, fair,
and free competition is necessary to the economic life
of a community, but under its guise, no ~man can, by
unlawful means, prevent another from obtaining the
fruits of his labor. 'The weapons used by the trader
who relies upon this right for justification must be
those furnished by the laws of trade, or, at least, must
not be inconsistent with their free operation. No man
can justify interference with another man's business
through fraud or misrepresentation, nor by intimidation, obstruction, or molestation.' Martell v. White,
185 Mass. 255, 261, 69 N. E. 1085, 1088, 64 L.R.A.
260, 102 Am. St. Rep. 341; Auburn Draying Co. v.
Wardell, 227 N. Y. 1, 11, 124 N. E. 97, 6 A. L. R.
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901; Virtue v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 123 Minn.
17, 31, 142 N. W. 930, 1136, L. R. A. 1915 B, 1179,
1195."

The defendants other than Utah Motor Club, Inc., promised plaintiff that they would make no agreement with Utah
Motor Club, Inc., which would not be satisfactory to plaintiff.
The law does not countenance the unconscionable conduct of a
principal and its officers in dealing with a prospect of the
agent to destroy the position and the promised economic future
of the agent.
The plaintiff asked for $10,000.00 general damages, and
$25,000.00 punitive damages. Both are justified.
CONCLUSION
The amended complaint states facts to warrant recovery
against each of the defendants. The motion to dismiss should
have been overruled, as the same is without merit. It was also
error for the District Court to enter a judgment of dismissal,
although the judgment was made nwithout prejudice." The
plaintiff is entitled to judicial relief, as involuntary servitude
would be accomplished if plaintiff were denied relief. We
respectfully submit that the judgment of the District Court
should be reversed, with costs to appellant, and that the cause
should be remanded with directions to overrule the motion to
dismiss.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL E. REIMANN
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant
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